The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United Nations Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks Might Preserve the Pollack Fishery by Goltz, Jon K.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 4 Number 2 
5-1-1995 
The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United Nations Draft 
Agreement on Straddling Stocks Might Preserve the Pollack 
Fishery 
Jon K. Goltz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jon K. Goltz, Comment, The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United Nations Draft Agreement on 
Straddling Stocks Might Preserve the Pollack Fishery, 4 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 443 (1995). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol4/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 1995 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association
THE SEA OF OKHOTSK PEANUT HOLE:
HOW THE UNITED NATIONS DRAFT AGREEMENT ON
STRADDLING STOCKS MIGHT PRESERVE THE
POLLACK FISHERY
Jon K. Goltz
Abstract: The enclave of international waters in the central Sea of Okhotsk, called
the '.peanut hole," is surrounded by the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") of
the Russian Federation. Since 1991, distant water fishing nations ("DWFNs") have been
fishing in the peanut hole in a manner that Russia claims is detrimental to the straddling
pollack fish stock that exists both in Russia's EEZ and in the enclave. To prevent
destruction of the pollack fishery, Russia imposed a moratorium on all fishing in the
enclave; the moratorium is not universally observed. The United Nations Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks has produced a Draft
Agreement which proposes improved procedures for creating international agreement on
conservation and management regimes for straddling fish stocks, primarily by requiring
compatibility of measures taken within and beyond the EEZ. The Draft Agreement also
provides for enforcement by flag states, dispute resolution, and cautious management in
the event of scientific uncertainty. Russia and DWFNs fishing in the peanut hole should
accede to the draft agreement because it avoids a Russian-imposed moratorium and
provides a practicable framework for preserving the pollack fishery.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sea of Okhotsk (pronounced "Ahk H6estk") lies off the southern
coast of the Russian Far East; it is framed by Sakhalin Island to the east, the
Kamchatka Peninsula to the west, Siberia to the north, and the Kurile
Islands to the south.) This biologically rich sea hosts an Alaskan pollack2
fishery which provides for trade between the Russian Far East and other
Pacific Rim countries, constituting a major source of income for the Russian
Far East.3 Russia also sells the right to fish for pollack within the Russian
I See infra, p. 444.
2 An alternative spelling of "pollack" is "pollock." This Comment adopts the former spelling as it
is used in United Nations documents. Some sources quoted below use the latter spelling.
3 Foreign trade in the city of Vladivostok in the Russian Far East amounted to US$337.7 million in
the first nine months of 1994, 81.6% of which was from fish and sea products. Japan, the People's
Republic of China ("PRC"), and the Republic of Korea ("ROK") were the city's three biggest trading
partners. Vladivostok Foreign Trade, PAC. RIM FISHERIES UPDATE, Feb. 1995, at 5. For the same time
period, trade for the Kamchatka region of the Russian Far East amounted to US$225 million, 99% of which
was from fish products. The Kamchatka area's four biggest trading partners were Japan, the ROK, the
United States of America, and the PRC. Foreign Trade in Kamchatka Region, PAC. RIM FISHERIES
UPDATE, Feb. 1995, at 5.
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exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") 4 to nations including Japan, South Korea,
Poland, and China.5 Pollack is an economically desirable fish, largely
because of its abundance. 6
About three percent of the Sea of Okhotsk, an enclave roughly thirty-
five miles wide and 300 miles long, lies outside of the EEZ of the Russian
Federation, and is thus considered under international law to be high seas
waters.7 This oblong high seas enclave, shaped like a peanut, has been
dubbed the "peanut hole." It is completely surrounded by the EEZ of the
Russian Federation.
In the autumn of 1991, ships of many nations began fishing heavily
for Alaskan pollack8 in the peanut hole. 9 The Russian Federation asserts
4 The EEZ is an innovation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N.
Doc. AIConf.62/122 (1982); 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter CLOS]. The EEZ may extend up to 200 miles
seaward from the baseline of a coastal state. Id. at 1280, art. 57. The baseline is the low water line along
the coast. Id at 1272, art. 5. According to the EEZ regime, a coastal state has exclusive rights to manage
and exploit fish within 200 miles of its shores. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 31
(1994). The coastal state may allow foreign states to fish within its EEZ on terms specified by the coastal
state. Id at 43. The EEZ regime is customary international law. Id at 1.
5 For example, in 1995 South Korea will pay a US$12,600,000 fee for harvesting 55,000 tons of
Alaskan pollack within the Russian EEZ, and trade 22,000 tons of Korean EEZ fish for a 22,000 ton quota
of Russian EEZ fish. More on South Korea's 1995 RFE Waters Fishing Quota, RUSSIAN FAR E. UPDATE,
Jan. 1995, at 5.
The selling of quotas (the right to fish for a specified type and amount of fish) is the primary
negotiating tool available to Russia as it attempts to solve the straddling stock problem by means of bilat-
eral agreements. For an explanation of the changing ways in which quotas are allocated, see Tatiana V.
Toumanova & Alice V. Blanchard, Comments on Doing Business in the Russian Federation, 6 U.S.F.
MAR. L.J. 519, 528-31 (1994). "The Committee of Fisheries allocates fishing quotas annually in accor-
dance with the recommendations of the scientific agencies of the Russian Federation." Id at 528.
6 In 1991, a larger portion of the world fish catch consisted of pollack than of any other species, and
the (now former) USSR, Japan, Korea, and China were the top pollack fishing nations. Fisheries Statistics:
Catches and Landings, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, vol. 72, at 187 (1991). Much of this
pollack comes from the Sea of Okhotsk. EDWARD MILES ET AL., ATLAS OF MARINE USE IN THE NORTH
PACIFIC REGION 42 (1982) (graphically depicting pollack fishing in the Northwest Pacific region including
the Sea of Okhotsk).
7 "High seas" are waters not included in the EEZ of any coastal nation. BURKE, supra note 4, at 82.
It is often asserted that according to contemporary international law, the traditional freedom of the right of
all nations to fish the high seas continues. Id. at 83-84, 93. As stated in article 116 of the U.N. Convention:
"All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to.
Qualification of this right is an issue addressed by this Comment.
8 Alaskan pollack is sometimes called Walleye pollack. MILES ET AL., supra note 6, at 42.
9 "In 1991, fleets mostly from Poland, China and the Republic of Korea, harvested some 700,000
metric tons of pollack in the Peanut Hole. In 1992, the catch could have been as high as I million metric
tons." Some High Seas Fisheries Aspects Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, at 10, n.3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.164/INF/4 (1993) [hereinafter Fisheries Aspects].
A more colorful, if hyperbolic, account of the increased fishing appeared in the newspaper:
"[Tihirty-nine Polish supertrawlers burst into the central part of the Sea of Okhotsk... followed by nine
large South Korean trawlers and almost the entire Chinese fishing fleet. Somewhat later, fishing ships
from Japan, Panama, Bulgaria and Ukraine appeared. A wild revelry began .... Reluctant to observe
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that the pollack in the peanut hole are part of the same stock that Russians
fish and manage in the Russian EEZ, giving rise to a problematic situation
called a "straddling stock."' 10 The pollack stock straddles the line, as
defined by international law, that separates the EEZ of the Russian
Federation from the high seas waters of the peanut hole, over which Russia
has little or no control.l1 Problems arise because the Russian regime for
managing the pollack fishery is frustrated when fishing practices in the
peanut hole (such as excessive fishing pressure) are inconsistent with the
management regime in the EEZ, thereby undermining attempts to effec-
tively manage the fishery as a whole. The Russian Federation asserts that
lack of effective management in the Sea of Okhotsk is causing excessive
depletion of the pollack fishery and disruption of the ecology of the Sea.
12
A solution to the conflict would prevent excessive depletion of the pollack
fishery in the Sea of Okhotsk. It would also avoid the consequences of
depletion, such as severe economic hardship on the Russian Far East 13 and
further strain on political relations with the flag states of foreign fishing
fleets. 14
As long as the conflict remains unresolved, domestic fishing interests
will pressure the Russian government to extend Russian jurisdiction over
the pollack stock in the peanut hole, thereby eliminating the high seas
enclave. 15 Such action would impair the viability of the United Nations
elementary international fishing regulations, foreign fishermen set to clearing out the wealth of the northern
sea." Yelena Matveyeva, On the Brink of a Military Conflict in the Sea of Okhotsk Moscow NEWS
WKLY., Aug. 20, 1993, at 15.
10 Consequences of Unscientific Fishing for Alaska Pollack in the Enclave of the Sea of Okhotsk, at
2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.164/L.21 (1993) [hereinafter Consequences].
II The extent of control Russia has over this area is uncertain, a subject of dispute, and a focus of
this Comment.
12 Consequences, supra note 10, at 2-3.
13 "The continued unscientific fishing ... will inevitably lead to ... severe social consequences for
the indigenous peoples and fishermen of the Russian Far East." Id. at 2.
14 In 1993, Russia's Pacific Fleet performed war games in the Sea of Okhotsk, frightening off about
30 South Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Panamanian ships fishing in the peanut hole. Moscow NEWS
WKLY., no. 25, June 16, 1993, available in Westlaw MOSNEWS Database.
When Poland, China, and South Korea initially refused to abide by the Russian moratorium on
fishing in the peanut hole, "Russian officials in New York responded that Moscow was prepared to take
'all necessary means' under international law to halt the fishing, which diplomats said could entail stopping
or seizing foreign trawlers and assessing captains for damages." David E. Pitt, Fishing Countries Split on
Harvest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, §1, at 9.
15 Whether extension ofjurisdiction would be legal is addressed infra, part II.C.I.b. It could be done
in any case with varying degrees of force. Russia could, for instance, enforce Russian fishing laws with the
Russian navy in the peanut hole, outside of the Russian EEZ.
VOL. 4 No. 2
SEA OF OKHOTSK PEANUT HOLE
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea ("CLOS") 16 and may threaten the
continued viability of the EEZ regime throughout the world if other states
also extend jurisdiction over their own straddling stocks. 17 The controversy
over the straddling stock in the Sea of Okhotsk is in many ways a critical
conflict, the resolution of which will presage the development of customary
international law of the sea and the CLOS. 18 It is important to the
continuing viability of the CLOS that the Okhotsk conflict be resolved in a
manner consistent with the CLOS. 19 In recognition of this and other
straddling stock problems around the globe, the United Nations has con-
vened a conference on straddling fish stocks for the purpose of creating
international procedures for solving straddling stock problems consistently
with the CLOS.20 The chairman of the conference has formulated a Revised
Draft Agreement (Draft Agreement) that points the way to a future treaty
pertaining to straddling stocks.21  This Comment analyzes the Draft
Agreement as revised in April 1995, in light of the peanut hole conflict.
Part II of this Comment will provide background to pertinent issues.
Sub-part A outlines the conflicting interests that give rise to straddling stock
problems generally, sub-part B describes in detail the problem as mani-
fested in the Sea of Okhotsk, sub-part C outlines the relevant law as it exists
as of this writing, and sub-part D explains the origin and application of the
Draft Agreement. Part III analyzes the Draft Agreement, especially as it
applies to the Sea of Okhotsk. Part IV explores four scenarios considering
how the Draft Agreement might provide for resolution of the peanut hole
16 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982); 21
I.L.M. 1261. The Convention dominates the international law of the sea. It is discussed in part II.C., infra.
17 If Russia does extend jurisdiction, Chile, Argentina, and Canada may also extend jurisdiction, as
each nation is currently embroiled in a straddling stock dispute. See Evelyne Metzler, Global Overview of
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries, 25
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 255, 268-72, 273-78, 297-305 (1994). If the 200 mile limit of the EEZ regime is
ignored with impunity, the whole CLOS is threatened. 88 A.J.I.L. 488, 497 (the future of the 1982 CLOS
may depend on the willingness of governments to negotiate constructively regarding straddling stocks).
Canada's conflict with the EC over straddling stocks recently came to a head when Canadian authorities
seized a Spanish trawler that was fishing outside the Canadian EEZ. See Edison Stewart, Canadians Seize
Spanish Trawler: Warning Shots Fired in Turbot War, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 10, 1995, at Al.
18 See infra, part II.B.
19 Id.
20 The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
Conference 164, held its organizational session in New York on April 19-23, 1993. The conference is
discussed in Part 111, infra.
21 Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doe. AIConf. 164/22/Rev. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Draft
Agreement].
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conflict. Part V concludes that the Draft Agreement is a feasible way to
resolve (and to prevent) straddling stock conflicts by consent of fishing
nations. Specifically, the Draft Agreement may guide the nations which are
parties to the Sea of Okhotsk conflict to an acceptable long-term regime for
conservation of the pollack stocks without impairing the CLOS.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Straddling Stocks as a Problem of the Commons
The problem of straddling stocks is a manifestation of the "tragedy of
the commons. 2 2 The tragedy is that when a common resource (such as
fish) is harvested by rational actors who cannot be assured of restraint by
other harvesters, and the ability to harvest exceeds the ability of the
resource to replenish, the resource will tend to be over-harvested. Due to
overcapitalization of much of the world's fishing fleet,23 effective manage-
ment of fisheries often requires harvesting less fish in the present to ensure
(at least probabilistically) harvests in the future. 24 Sustainable harvests are
most likely achieved when one harvester is assured that restraint in the
present will improve the prospects for rewards in the future. 25 As stated by
the chairman of the straddling stocks conference, "Unregulated fishing is
susceptible to the greed of fishermen and to the false logic that if you leave
any fish behind, someone else will catch it anyway." 2
6
22 The phrase comes from Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Coimons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), and
is used extensively in environmental literature. The theory denoted by the phrase is pithily put in a quota-
tion from the article: "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." Id at 1244.
23 Statement made by the Chairman of the Conference at the opening of the Fourth Session, held on
Aug. 15, 1994, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.164/21 (1994), [hereinafter Statement] citing Earth Summit,
Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/21/Rev.I (1992).
24 While environmental factors may more significantly affect abundance of a fish stock than human
activities, the latter can have a substantial impact, as they do especially in the peanut hole. BURKE, supra
note 4, at 27. But see infra, part ll.B.3 (excessive fishing in the donut and peanut holes have significantly
depleted fish stocks).
25 In Hardin's article, supra note 22, individual persons are considered harvesters. In the context of
this Comment, nations are considered individual harvesters. Although this may change nuances of
Hardin's analysis, the principle still applies inasmuch as nations tend to act rationally, i.e., in pursuit of
enlightened self-interest, much as individuals do. For example, China has less incentive to control the
harvest of its fishing fleet if it feels Korea will simply catch all the fish China refrains from catching. But
see BURKE, supra note 4, at 80 (the legal right of coastal nations to manage fish within their EEZs has not
generally led to effective management).
26 Statement, supra note 23, at 1.
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A primary purpose of the EEZ regime is to enclose the commons so
that a coastal nation that manages a fishery sustainably reaps the benefits of
its restraint.27 The weakness in the regime is that it fails to account for the
fact that not all fish which occur in the EEZ stay within the EEZ at all
times,28 thus enabling nations other than the coastal nation to catch them,
and thereby undermining the purpose of the regime. in the case of a
straddling stock such as the pollack in the Sea of Okhotsk,29 the legal
entitlements of Russia (the coastal nation) and distant water fishing nations
("DWFNs") can result in ineffective management. This result occurs in two
main ways. First, Russia's management of the EEZ fishery is frustrated
when fish that Russians refrain from catching (or selling the right to catch)
may be caught by DWFNs when the fish migrate into the peanut hole.
Thus, restraint by Russia does not adequately promote the continuing exis-
tence of the stock. Instead, it makes more fish available to those fishing in
the peanut hole and thereby undermines the incentive for Russians to fish
conservatively. 30 Second, DWFNs have little or no reason to regulate their
own harvest in the absence of multilateral agreement because no manage-
ment regime applies to high seas waters, and competition obviously exists
for the limited pollack resource. The incentive in a straddling stock situ-
ation is perverse-it is to catch as many fish as possible as quickly as
possible, without regard to scientifically sound fishing, or the effect on
Russia's management regime.
27 "The basic policy of the 1982 Convention is that effective conservation and management of
coastal species require recognition of a single management unit and that coastal states, as single manage-
ment units, should be employed wherever feasible" (footnotes omitted). William T. Burke, Fishing in the
Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New International Law of Fisheries 16 ECOL. L. Q. 285, 304
(1989)Jhereinafter Straddling Stocks].
98 "The point could be made that nearly all resources taken on the high seas occur within EEZs at
some stage of their life history." Report of the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing and the
Papers Presented at the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, at 47, para. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 164/INF/2 (1993).
29 A stock can be straddling in different ways. Even sedentary stocks that occur on both sides of the
EEZ border may be considered straddling. High diffusion stocks, characterized by extensive random
movements and mixing, must be managed as one unit. Helpful diagrams of straddling stocks can be found
in Fisheries Aspects, supra note 9, at 15 (Annex V). Pollack in the Sea of Okhotsk intermingle in the
peanut hole, but reproduce elsewhere. See infra, part ll.B.2. Knowing where the fish are and when, is, of
course, necessary for effective management of the stock.
30 Recall the so-called "false logic" described in the text accompanying n.26, supra.
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B. The Unique Nature of the Peanut Hole
The peanut hole is unique, as is each straddling stock situation, in the
particular geographical, biological and political factors that define the
conflict. The particular nature of the peanut hole, however, makes this
conflict an especially good measure of how straddling stock problems might
be resolved globally, and whether such resolutions will be consistent with
the CLOS and customary international law. For instance, the intensity of
the fishery causes some to contend that the conflict must be resolved
quickly if the fishery is to be maintained. 31 Thus, there is pressure to
achieve an effective solution. Additionally, Russia's position as a coastal
nation in this dispute and a DWFN in other straddling stock conflicts makes
the peanut hole situation worthy of close study. Because Russia has both
coastal and distant interests, an efficacious international law that is agree-
able to Russia might be agreeable to a majority of fishing nations, both
coastal and distant. The particulars of the situation are addressed below.
1. Geography
a. Extension ofjurisdiction
The Sea of Okhotsk is the only sea in the world which has a high seas
enclave surrounded by the EEZ of a single state.32 By adding just eighteen
miles to its management enforcement area, Russia could eclipse the peanut
hole altogether.33 Conceivably, Russia could extend jurisdiction 34 by effec-
tively claiming an EEZ beyond the 200 mile limit, or by asserting exclusive
authority over the pollack stock. Doing the former would contravene inter-
31 "Russian biologists predict that the fishery will collapse within 3 years . Metzler, supra note
17, at 291.
32 Annex, Threat of Destruction ofAlaska Pollack Stocks in the Sea of Okhotsk as a Consequence of
Continued Unregulated and Unscientific Fishing in its Enclave, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./1 64/L.43 (1994).
33 Russia is authorized under the EEZ regime to enforce fisheries regulation up to 200 miles from
shore, but if it enforced regulations up to 218 miles from shore, it would control fisheries in the entire Sea
of Okhotsk. The EEZ is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State as far as fishing is concerned, but
other nations are allowed, inter alia, innocent passage (as provided in part 2, § 3 of the 1982 U.N.
Convention) as part of the freedom of navigation. However, there is no place to pass to in an enclave, and
any boat in the peanut hole is probably there to catch fish.
34 "Coastal state authority, or jurisdiction, over fisheries refers to the competence of the coastal state
to prescribe and to apply policy, including regulations, to fishing activity within an area claimed to be
subject to that authority" (footnote omitted). BURKE, supra note 4, at 26.
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national law as an impermissible extension of jurisdiction.35 Doing the
latter raises a more sophisticated legal question. In any event, the ease with
which jurisdiction could be extended puts pressure on the Russian govern-
ment to do so, especially when citizens plead for governmental action.36
Russia is reluctant to extend jurisdiction, through, for a variety of
reasons. Customary international law recognizes an EEZ up to 200 miles
from the baseline but not further.37 Additionally, Russia is itself a high seas
fishing nation that fishes straddling stocks in other parts of the world,
notably off the coasts of New Zealand, Argentina, and Canada. 38 Extending
jurisdiction in the peanut hole might encourage other nations to assert juris-
diction beyond 200 miles to protect their own straddling stocks, in some
cases to the detriment of Russian fishing operations. The first deviation
from the 200 mile limit is likely to be the most difficult to justify; if and
when it occurs, highly charged straddling stock situations might motivate
other nations to follow suit and to extend their own jurisdictions. Further-
more, once the 200 mile limit of the CLOS is ignored, nations might feel
more free to ignore other burdensome aspects of the regime, resulting in
erosion of the efficacy of the CLOS.39 The challenge posed by the peanut
hole is to solve the problem without an extension of jurisdiction that would
erode the structure of international law which rests so fundamentally on the
200 mile limit of coastal state jurisdiction.
b. Poaching
The enclosed nature of the peanut hole creates the possibility of ships
lingering in the peanut hole for the purpose of venturing into the Russian
EEZ to fish illegally. 40 Due in large part to fuel shortages in the Russian
35 The EEZ regime, under the CLOS and customary international law, allows an EEZ up to 200
miles, but not further, from the coast. Id.
36 A cable signed on behalf of 180 Russian fishing crews was sent to President Yeltsin, Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin, the Committee of Fishing, and Dalryba urging the government to adopt certain
measures, including allowing Russian fishermen to block foreign vessels fishing in the peanut hole.
Captains' Request for Solving Okhotsk Sea Problem, PAC. RIM FISHERIES UPDATE, Mar. 1994, at 4.
37 BURKE supra note 4, at 31, 40. For explanation of the baseline, see supra, note 4.
38 See Metzler, supra note 17, at 263, fig. I.
39 See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 14, at 9 ("Mr. Nandan, who is overseeing the U.N. conference said he
was worried that an accumulation of disputes, similar to the peanut hole dispute, could threaten the Law of
the Sea, which he said 'contributes to the peaceful use of 70 percent of the earth's surface.' ").
40 Letter Dated Mar. 22, 1994, From the Chairman of the Delegation of the Russian Federation
Addressed to the Chairman of the Conference, Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 164/L.43 (1993) ("Foreign
fishing vessels use the enclave as a base for illegal poaching of fish even in the economic zone of the
Russia Federation in the Sea of Okhotsk.").
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Far East in the early 1990s, enforcement of fisheries law and regulations in
the Sea of Okhotsk has been poor.4 1 The simple existence of boats in the
peanut hole creates the possibility and threat of poaching by foreign vessels
in the Russian EEZ. An anti-poaching campaign, "Operation Putina," was
in effect in 1994 to crack down on illegal fishing by foreign vessels within
the Russian EEZ.42 The operation has met with some success, 43 but
poaching and the threat of poaching remain problems which pressure Russia
to extend jurisdiction over the peanut hole.
2. Scientific Information
Accurate knowledge of the biology of the pollack stock is, of course,
crucial to effective management of fishing. Russia contends that as a rule,
in an enclave situation like the peanut hole, the coastal nation knows more
about the stock and how to manage fishing of it than does a DWFN, because
the coastal nation is likely to have studied the greatest portion of the stock
over the greatest period of time, and has more experience with its manage-
ment and conservation. 44  Therefore, Russia suggests, the minimum
standards for conservation of a straddling stock, especially in an enclave
situation, should be the regime developed and tested by the coastal nation. 45
Given the technological, scientific, and institutional differences among
nations, though, it may not always be true that a coastal nation has better
knowledge of a fish stock.
The Russian government claims to have significant information on
pollack in the Sea of Okhotsk. For instance, Russia asserts that sub-
populations of the pollack stock reproduce in the northwestern, northern,
41 "Foreign trawlers [fishing in the 200-mile Soviet economic zone in the Okhotsk Sea] cannot be
arrested as coast guards vessels have no fuel." CIS Econ. & Foreign Trade, Nov. 14, 1991, available in
Westlaw CISECFT Database.
42 Anti-Poaching Campaign in the Russian Economic Zone in the Sea of Okhotsk Launched,
RUSSIAN FAR E. UPDATE, June 1994, at 8.
43 Id The operation, although somewhat successful in discouraging poaching by foreign vessels,
has caught far more Russian than foreign poachers. Operation Putina is part of an extensive anti-poaching
campaign in the Russian Far East (especially the Southern Primorskii Krai, Sakhalin eastern coast, the
Kurile Straits) and in Russia generally. The Kamchatka region has its own anti-poaching program, called
the "Losos." Update on RFE's Anti-Poaching Operations, RUSSIAN FAR E. UPDATE, Sept. 1994, at 5.
44 Aspects of fishing to be regulated include the areas where fishing is allowed, total allowable catch,
size and age of legal fish, types of gear allowed, amount of effort expended, and surveillance of fishing
operations. Letter Dated July 27, 1993, from the Alternate Chairman of the Delegation of the Russian
Federation Addressed to the Chairman of the Conference, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 164/L.27 (1993).
45 Id. at 2.
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and eastern parts of the Sea and intermingle in the peanut hole. 46 For this
reason, there has long been a permanent ban on fishing by Russian
fishermen in the central part of the Sea, which has also been observed by
countries traditionally fishing in the Sea.4 7
Scientific knowledge of the ecology of the area in which the strad-
dling stock exists is also pertinent to a solution. Over fishing of straddling
stocks has an "unknown impact on species interaction and marine ecosys-
tems within national jurisdiction and on the high seas."48 In the Sea of
Okhotsk, for example, Alaskan pollack is the main prey of juvenile Coho
salmon.49 Significant depletion of pollack may adversely affect the salmon
fishery, which in turn may affect marine mammal populations, possibly
with unforeseen disruption to the ecosystem of the Sea.50
Lack of scientific information and disagreement about the informa-
tion that does exist are characteristic of straddling stock situations. As is
typical, the genesis of the problem in the peanut hole was that Russia
claimed impending doom for the Sea when other nations claimed there was
no reliable evidence that pollack stocks were reducing. 51 The peanut hole
conflict thus confirms that procedures for collection of credible scientific
knowledge will be an essential part of any legal regime for solving strad-
dling stock problems; the more reliable and complete the information, the
better the prospects for agreements to be negotiated quickly and complied
with voluntarily.
3. Political Urgency Instilled by History
The history of another straddling stock problem, the "donut hole" in
the Bering Sea, affects the concerns and political relations of parties to the
peanut hole conflict. A summary understanding of the rise and resolution of
the donut hole conflict, which was also an Alaskan pollack fishery adjacent
46 Consequences, supra note 10, at 2.
47 Id.
48 Metzler, supra note 17, at 261.
49 28 J. ICHTHYOLOGY 101, 103 (1988) (juvenile Coho salmon in the Sea of Okhotsk feed mainly in
coastal waters where their main prey, juvenile walleye (Alaskan] pollack, are concentrated).
50 Consequences, supra note 10, at 3.
51 "The Russian side is of the opinion that the Walley [Walleye] pollock catch is excessive which
may result in the extinction of the fish. Poland is of the opinion that there are no scientific data related to
the state of the fish resources and only after collecting such data can one say whether present fishing
threatens walley pollock." PAP Polish Press Agency News Wire, July 29, 1994, available in LEXIS,
NEXIS Library, NON-US File. Walleye is an alternative name for Alaskan pollack. MILES et al., supra
note 6, at 42.
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to the EEZ of Russia and involved many of the same nations party to the
peanut hole conflict, will elucidate the problem at issue.
a. Straddling pollack stock in the donut hole
The waters of the high seas enclave known as the donut hole lie in the
central Bering Sea, and are surrounded by the EEZs of the Russian
Federation and the United States (Alaska). As the fishing capacity of the
U.S. fleet increased in the 1980s, and consequently quotas to foreign fleets
decreased, there was a gradual movement of Japanese, South Korean,
Polish, and Soviet pollack fishing fleets from the EEZ of the United States
to the international waters of the Central Bering Sea.52 As fishing pressure
increased, the pollack stocks became fully (and then over-) exploited, and
the stock size53 and catch54 quickly plummeted.
By 1992, pollack stocks were significantly depleted in the donut
hole. 55 As a result of ten conferences, a convention ("the Donut Hole
Convention") was signed in 1994 by all nations fishing in the central Bering
Sea to provide for conservation of pollack in the donut hole. 56 In the peanut
hole, as in the donut hole, the coastal nations had to shut down their own
fisheries to mitigate the effects of over-harvesting, while DWFNs continued
to fish.57 Russia and the United States, with the cooperation of the People's
Republic of China, Poland, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, decided to
extend a moratorium on pollack fishing in the donut hole at least until the
fall of 1995 when a conference is scheduled to be held.58 Notably, the
nations involved have been temporarily able to suspend fishing by agree-
ment, without an extension of jurisdiction by either coastal state, although
an extension was encouraged by some in the U.S. fishing industry. 59
52 Metzler, supra note 17, at 283-84.
53 Id. at 285.
54 Id. at 287, tbl. 3.
55 The pollack catch declined from over 1.4 million tons in 1989 to less than seven thousand tons in
1992. Id. See also Testimony of Ambassador David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Ocean Affairs, United States Department of State before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S.
Senate, Sept. 28, 1994, available in Westlaw USTESTIMONY Database. See also, Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 164/L.33 (1993) [hereinafter Conservation and Management].
56 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering
Sea, June 16, 1994, Japan-PRC-Korea-Pol.-Russian Federation-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 67 (1994). As of January
1995, the convention had been signed by each party but not ratified by any party. Id.
57 Conservation and Management, supra note 56, at 1.
58 RUssIAN FAR E. UPDATE, Dec. 1994, at 6, 11.
59 Metzler, supra note 17, at 288.
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b. How the donut hole affects the peanut hole
Fortunately, because of similarities between the donut hole and the
peanut hole conflicts, a solution to the donut hole (such as the Donut Hole
Convention) may be adapted to the peanut hole. Unfortunately, DWFNs did
not suspend fishing in the donut hole until the fishery was no longer eco-
nomically viable, which portends an ill fate for the peanut hole.60 As a
result of the depleted stocks and the moratorium in the donut hole, ships
previously in the donut hole moved to the peanut hole to continue similar
fishing operations. 6 ' The increase of fishing in the peanut hole occurred
even more quickly than in the donut hole, giving rise to concerns that stock
depletion would be swift. The peanut hole is small, covering only about
10,500 square miles; in contrast, the donut hole spreads across about
661,000 square miles. 62 Negotiations for a conservation regime for the
donut hole took years to accomplish a moratorium on fishing, and continue
still as the fish stocks recover. Meanwhile, the fishery remains at least tem-
porarily commercially unproductive. Comparison to the donut hole gives a
sense of urgency to the straddling stock problem of the peanut hole.
4. Russian Moratorium
The sense of urgency caused the Russian Federation to impose drastic
measures of protection on the peanut hole. On April 16, 1993, the Russian
Parliament adopted a decree which prohibited fishing by Russian and
foreign vessels in the Central Sea of Okhotsk, effective June 15, 1993:
"[T]he Federation is temporarily halting fishing of the biological resources
60 Conservation and Management, supra note 56, at 1.
61 Id. at 2. See also Senate Report on the Sea of Okhotsk Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1993, S. Rep.
No. 218, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) available in Westlaw LH Database. The Act would prohibit U.S.
fishermen from fishing in the peanut hole and impose for civil penalties. There has been no U.S. fishing in
the peanut hole. David A. Colson, Current Issues in International Fishery Conservation and Management,
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans of the House Subcommittee on
Resources, Jan. 25, 1995, U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, vol. 6, No. 7, available in LEXIS, INTLAW
Library, DSTATE File (reporting that there have been rumors of U.S. vessels wishing to fish in the peanut
hole, and urging passage of the Sea of Okhotsk Enforcement Act which would prohibit U.S. vessels from
fishing in the peanut hole, so as to avoid jeopardizing cooperation between the United States and the
Russian Federation on fisheries issues).
62 William J. Kirby, [The Straddling Stock Dilemma in the Bering Sea Donut Hole: Initiating a Sea-
Wide Regime, Avoiding NAFO's Pitfalls] 6 (1990) (unpublished paper, on file at the University of
Washington Gallagher Law Library).
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in [the central part of the Sea of Okhotsk] by Russian and foreign ships until
an appropriate international agreement has been reached. '6 3 Russia appar-
ently has not attempted to enforce the moratorium, but enforcement was not
necessary for the decree to have some effect. South Korea and China
initially refused to abide by the moratorium, 64 but later reached bilateral
agreements with the Russian Federation which allow access to pollack in
the Russian EEZ in return for refraining from fishing in the peanut hole.65
Poland also initially spurned the moratorium, and continues to negotiate
with Russia. 66 By the time the decree was issued, Japan had already ceased
fishing for pollack in the peanut hole.67
The moratorium was to continue while multilateral negotiations took
place in an attempt to reach more permanent agreement. 68 In March 1995,
Russia announced it would continue to apply national management meas-
ures to the peanut hole.69 By then, however, Russia had concluded bilateral
agreements with all major DWFNs fishing in the peanut hole except Poland,
and the prospects for the pollack fishery in general were reported to be
good. 70 This favorable report seems incongruous with the impending
collapse of the fishery predicted by the Russian delegation to the U.N. con-
ference on straddling stocks, and apparently contradictory information
exists. 71 In part, the apparent health of the pollack fishery may be due to the
63 Metzler, supra note 17, at 293 (quoting Decree on Measures to Protect Biological Resources of
the Sea Of Okhotsk, Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, no. 935DO384C (May 5, 1993): 5).
64 Metzler, supra note 17, at 293. See also, Korea Plans Okhotsk Fishing Despite Ban, KOREA
ECON. DAILY, Aug. 27, 1993 available in Westlaw MAGSPLUS Database.
65 Poles Continue to Fish Peanut Hole, PAC. RIM FISHERIES UPDATE, Feb. 1995, at 6.
66 Foreign Vessels Still Fishing in Peanut Hole, PAC. RIM FISHERIES UPDATE, Feb. 1995, at 6.
Negotiations between Poland and Russia broke off in March 1995. Polish-Russian Fishing Talks Severed,
Gazeta Wyborcza, March 9, 1995 at 13, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PNBUL File.
67 Metzler, supra note 17, at 292.
68 Id. at 293.
69 Russia to Extend Pollock Fishing Curb to Whole of Sea of Okhotsk, ITAR-TASS News Agency,
March 31, 1995, reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 7, 1995, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, NON-US File.
70 RFE Fishing Council Meets to Discuss the Industry, RUSSIAN FAR E. UPDATE, Nov. 1994, at 5. It
may be that the pollack stock in the EEZ is in good condition but the stock in the peanut hole is declining.
If so, this would undercut Russia's contention that pollack in the Sea of Okhotsk is one stock. Alterna-
tively, it may be that over time the fish in the EEZ will decline in abundance. Whatever the precise health
of the fishery is, this report indicates that collapse of the stock is not imminent.
71 See, e.g., Threat of the Destruction of Alaska Pollack Stocks in the Sea of Okhotsk as a
Consequence of Continued Unregulated and Unscientific Fishing in its Enclave, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.164/L.43 (Annex) (1994). See also Conference Documents, available in World Wide Web,
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/vo107/0742002e.html ("Document A/Conf.164/L.49, submitted by the Russian
Federation on 30 March 1995, details the 'Growing threat of the destruction of Alaska pollack stocks in the
Sea of Okhotsk as a consequence of large-scale unregulated and unscientific fishing in its enclave."').
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decreased capacity of the Russian fishing fleet resulting from vessel obso-
lescence, lack of fuel, and other problems. 72  Also, the negotiated
agreements with all nations but Poland seem to have significantly defused
the situation. Nonetheless, the agreements are negotiated annually, and no
matter what the present stock abundance is, the underlying problems of
management and access to the straddling stock remain. These problems
threaten to reappear if and when disagreement arises between Russia and a
major DWFN. The Draft Agreement seeks to prevent such a flare
up73-something the CLOS failed to do.
C. The 1982 Convention and Customary International Law
On November 16, 1994, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea ("CLOS") entered into force, becoming binding law on the
sixty nations that have ratified the Convention. 74 The CLOS is a result of
the nine-year Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.75 The provi-
sions applicable to the EEZ (and therefore in large part to fisheries) are
widely considered to be part of customary international law.76 Even when
the CLOS is not in force between parties to a straddling stock dispute: (1)
the disputants may choose to adopt the treaty as guiding procedural and
substantive law; (2) one nation may unilaterally offer to proceed according
to the treaty; or (3) all parties may proceed according to the treaty without a
formal agreement. 77 One value of having a treaty such as the CLOS is
having routine dispute resolution procedures, 78 which are available even to
72 Focus: Fishing in the Russian Far East, RUSSIAN FAR E. UPDATE, Oct., 1994, at 7.
73 "The objective of this Agreement is to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of
straddling fish stocks .... Draft Agreement, supra note 2 1, at 3.
74 See, e.g., John R. Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, Comment: The Future of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 88 A.J.I.L. 488, 488 (1994) ("An overwhelming majority of states have
signed the convention, over sixty have ratified it, and it will enter into force on November 16, 1994.").
75 Prior to the Third U.N. Conference, the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas existed, which in article I provides for a modification of the aaditional
freedom to fish the high seas, subjecting it to the interests and rights of the coastal state. This modification
was incorporated into article 116 of the 1982 CLOS. The 1958 Convention has a very limited conception
of conservation, and its provisions have never been implemented and is thus mostly irrelevant now.
BURKE, supra note 4, at 11-13.
76 Id. at 23.
77 E.L. Miles & W.T. Burke, Pressures on the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of
1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
LAW 343, 352-53 (1989).
78 Id. at 356.
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nations not bound by its terms. The CLOS does address straddling stocks
expressly.
1. 1982 CLOS and Straddling Stocks
a. Duty to seek agreement
The CLOS provides that in the event of a straddling stock: "the
coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall
seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organi-
zations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these
stocks in the adjacent area."'79 The CLOS thus envisions two possibilities:
(1) a regional organization formed with the consent of interested nations
and authorized by those nations to manage fishing of a straddling stock; or
(2) agreement among nations, without the formation of a separate organiza-
tion, brought about by direct bilateral or multilateral negotiations. The
CLOS, however, does not require (by this provision, at least) anything more
of the disputing nations than that they seek to agree. Nations may, consis-
tent with the Convention, and in good faith, fail to agree on measures for the
conservation of a straddling stock.80
There is no regional fisheries organization active in the Sea of
Okhotsk, and it is unlikely that a regional organization encompassing the
peanut hole would form in the foreseeable future, unless the organization
affords Russia significant management discretion and enforcement powers.
Russia does have improving relations with some neighboring fishing
nations, such as Japan, and their cooperation would be expected in forging a
regional organization.8' It is not impossible that such an organization could
form, and it may be that a truly effective long term management regime for
fisheries in the area will require a regional organization authorized to
enforce regional measures. But, given Russian dominance of the Sea of
Okhotsk by virtue of its surrounding EEZ and the Russian assertion that all
fishing historically took place in the peanut hole only under intergovern-
79 CLOS, supra note 4, at art. 3, para. 2.
80 Contra, Miles & Burke, supra note 77, at 352 (arguing that in the event disagreement obtains, a
coastal state has a superior right). This interpretation, that coastal nations have a superior right, has not
been reflected in practice. See infra, text accompanying notes 90-9 1.
81 Tsuneo Akaha, From Conflict to Cooperation: Fishery Relations in the Sea of Japan, I PAC. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 225, 266-67 (fairness and equity are beginning to characterize some bilateral agreements in
the Sea of Japan, and fairness will be a key characteristic of any successful cooperative fishing arrange-
ments among Japan, Russia, and Korea).
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mental agreements, Russia will be reluctant to relinquish its claim to control
fisheries in the area. Considering the necessary conditions for a regional
organization is beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is relevant to note
that establishment of regional fisheries organizations does not necessarily
solve straddling stock problems, as the experience of the North Atlantic
Fisheries Organization proves.8 2
b. Hierarchy of rights
Even in the absence of a regional organization encompassing the
peanut hole, the CLOS does provide a hierarchy of rights that form the basis
of a legal solution to a straddling stock problem. Article 116 provides:
"[a]ll States have the right to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject to:
(a) their treaty obligations; (b) the rights and duties as well as the interests
of the coastal States provided for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2."83
Thus, the right of a state to fish on the high seas appears to be subject to the
interests of a coastal state in conserving and managing its fish stocks.
Professor William Burke, of the University of Washington, has advocated
this interpretation of the CLOS, based on the sovereign rights of the coastal
nation.84 Burke observes that article 56, read in conjunction with article
63(2), limits the freedom to fish the high seas.8 5 Article 56 provides that in
the EEZ, a coastal state has sovereign rights to biological resources.8 6
Merely seeking agreement does not preserve a coastal state's sovereign
rights if fish stocks in the EEZ are adversely affected by fishing in adjacent
international waters.87 Furthermore, the rights of a coastal state over
biological resources in the EEZ include the right to manage the resources in
a manner designed to achieve economic, social and political as well as
82 See, e.g., Metzler, supra note 18, at 299 (the regional organization [NAFO] has failed to resolve
conflicts over straddling stocks).
83 Article 63, para. 2, is excerpted, supra. text accompanying note 79.
84 BURKE, supra note 4, at 133. See also, Straddling Stocks, supra note 27, at 300.
85 Straddling Stocks, supra note 27, at 299.
86 Article 56(l)(a) reads in pertinent part: "In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing, the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed ......
87 Id. at 299. Cf Kirby, supra note 57, at 29, n.68. Kirby argues that Burke's analysis fails because
article 56 reads: "[iln the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of
[managing natural resources]..." instead of "the coastal state has sovereign rights for purposes of...
managing natural resources in the EEZ" (emphasis added). Thus, argues Kirby, the sovereign rights apply
only within the EEZ and do not extend to any activity on the high seas. The language of the Convention is
ambiguous on this point, but Burke's interpretation appears to be the better one because it is more consis-
tent with the purposes of the EEZ and conservation.
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environmental goals, 88 making management of the fisheries a matter almost
entirely of coastal state discretion.8 9 Arguably then, the CLOS condones
the moratorium declared by Russia.
In practice, it has not been confirmed that DWFNs must submit to the
interests or sovereign rights of a coastal nation.90 In fact, coastal states have
generally not taken unilateral action against DWFNs to protect straddling
stocks.9 1 Russia's moratorium was not universally observed, and Russia
apparently did not seek enforcement of its moratorium in an international
tribunal, suggesting that a coastal state in a straddling stock situation is
practically powerless. This is a recognized fault of the CLOS.
2. Shortcomings of 1982 CLOS
a. Vagueness
Although the CLOS subjects the freedom to fish the high seas to the
interests and rights of a coastal state, it does not indicate how the rights are
qualified, or how restrictions on the right would be applied to a DWFN. 92
The vagueness of the hierarchy of rights hinders the Convention's effec-
tiveness because it fails to provide a mechanism for the ordering of the
rights.
The vagueness is largely a result of the exigencies of negotiating the
Convention. Legislative history of the 1982 CLOS reveals that proposed
amendments to the straddling stock provisions (such as a dispute settlement
tribunal to determine conservation measures in the event nations fail to
88 BURKE, supra note 4, at 54-55.
89 The only sense in which a coastal state does not have discretion in management of fisheries
occurring within its EEZ is when it is determined that a surplus of fish exists over the amount which the
coastal state will harvest. In this case, coastal states are to allow foreign states to fish in the EEZ. Since
the coastal states determine when a surplus exists, management of the fishery is virtually entirely within the
discretion of the coastal state. See BURKE, supra note 4, at 44 ("The [1982] convention explicitly declares
that the coastal state has discretion to establish the allowable catch. The catch may be set in accordance
with the coastal state's judgment about both the level of abundance and the rate of replacement of the
fisheiz stocks which will serve the coastal state's economic and other interests.") (footnotes omitted).
90 BURKE supra, note 4, at 135.
91 The most significant exception is the February 1995 seizure of a Spanish fishing vessel by
Canada. See, e.g., Canadians Seize Spanish Trawler, supra note 17. The Canadian action provides
corroborating evidence for the argument that without an effective international law governing straddling
stocks coastal states will begin to take unilateral action. Compare, BURKE, supra note 4, at 136 (the pattern
of inaction on the part of coastal states could give rise to the expectation that coastal states do not have an
enforceable superior right).
92 Burke, supra note 9, at 95.
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agree by direct negotiations) 93 were withdrawn out of fear that they might
jeopardize the whole Convention. 94 Opposition to the amendments came
from Japan and the Soviet Union, both DWFNs. 95 By painting with a broad
brush over problems that were only incubating at the time of the
Conference, the Convention inadequately addresses straddling stock prob-
lems as manifested in the 1990s. 96
b. Lack ofprovision for enforcement
Probably the primary shortcoming of the CLOS regarding straddling
stocks is that it fails to provide for enforcement of a coastal state manage-
ment regime against a DWFN fishing a straddling stock beyond the EEZ. 97
Since the CLOS authorizes coastal states to regulate salmon fishing beyond
200 miles but expressly requires consent of the high-seas fishing states for
enforcement, it is unlikely that any provision of the CLOS will be inter-
preted to confer any greater enforcement power over straddling stocks. No
express provision for enforcement is provided. 98
The CLOS authorizes a coastal state to propose a management regime
to a DWFN fishing outside the EEZ and to seek dispute resolution in the
event a DWFN refuses to abide by the coastal state's proposed regula-
tions.99 Notably, the coastal state is not authorized to enforce any measures
beyond the EEZ; enforcement of legal obligations of vessels fishing on the
high seas is left to flag states. 100 Thus, although the authority to prescribe
management measures for the fishing of straddling stocks in the high seas
93 Straddling Stocks, supra note 27 at 301 (dispute resolution was part of an Argentine proposal that
provided for indirect application of coastal state measures in the event nations failed to agree).
94 Metzler supra, note 17, at 257.
95 BURKE, supra note 4, at 34. See also Metzler, supra note 17, at 302, text accompanying n.56.
96 "The problems of high seas fishing which this Conference is asked to address are not new. They
were known to the participants of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, but attempts
to deal with them at that time were not very successful, largely because they were not seen as urgent ....
However, events in the last decade and more have clearly indicated that with the advent of the exclusive
economic zone, the pressure on high seas fishing has grown rapidly, and the problems have become more
urgent than they were at the time the Convention was being negotiated." Statement made by the Chairman
of the Conference at the Opening of the Organizational Session, Held on 19 April 1993, at I, UN. Doc.
A/Conf. 164/7.
97 BURKE, supra note 4, at 134 (noting only two instances in which a coastal state may be authorized
by the CLOS to enforce measures on the high seas, neither of which is directly relevant).
98 Straddling Stocks, supra note 27, at 303.
99 Miles & Burke, supra note 77, at 352 (in the event of disagreement, the coastal state cannot
enforce its management regime, but can only seek dispute resolution).
100 BURKE, supra note 4, at 134, 306.
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may be inferred from the CLOS, authority to enforce the prescription is
lacking.
c. Fundamental inconsistency of the EEZ with ecosystem management
The CLOS is based on the political foundation of coastal state sover-
eign rights up to 200 miles from shore (the EEZ), but ecosystems do not
conform to a 200 mile political boundary.'01 When this inconsistency
cannot be accommodated by negotiations, and international law fails to
provide for application of hierarchical rights and enforcement, straddling
stocks may suffer over fishing. Ultimately, nations that depend on those
stocks will bear the cost of their depletion. In recognition of the fact that
talks have been failing throughout the world, and due to growing concerns
about the sustainability of high seas fishing, the United Nations convened a
conference to address the issue.1 02
D. The 1995 Revised Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks
1. Origin and Relevance
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks held its organizational session in April 1993. The
stated mandate of the Conference is to promote the implementation of the
provisions of the CLOS pertaining to straddling fish stocks.' 03 At the fourth
session, held in August 1994, the Chairman of the Conference prepared a
draft agreement. 104 At the fifth session, held in March and April of 1995,
the chairman revised the Draft Agreement.
The Revised Draft Agreement (Draft Agreement) is at this time the
best indication of how the straddling stock problem in the peanut hole might
be solved within the strictures of international law, that is, without the
Russian Federation unilaterally extending its jurisdiction and asserting
management authority in the high seas enclave. Russia has been exten-
101 BURKE, supra note 4, at 81.
102 Draft Agreement, supra note 21.
103 The mandate extends also to highly migratory fish stocks, which include such fish as tuna,
which are not addressed in this Comment.
104 Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 164/22 (1994).
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sively involved in the conference and formulation of the Agreement.105 As
it is still only a draft, the Agreement has no binding force for any nation and
may be modified before it is opened for signature. Analysis of its present
form, though, may forecast the future management of the Sea of Okhotsk
pollack resource, and furthermore, may indicate whether the CLOS will rule
the sea in future years. If a solution to the straddling stock problem cannot
be found within the CLOS, the future of the entire CLOS is questionable.
2. Application of the Draft Agreement
a. Application to fisheries
The Draft Agreement applies to the conservation and management of
straddling fish stocks beyond areas under national jurisdiction. 106 Thus,
management of the portion of the pollack stock within the Russian EEZ is
unaffected by the Agreement. However, the Agreement provides for two
major exceptions. 107  The provisions of article 6 (pertaining to the
"precautionary approach") and article 7 (pertaining to "compatibility")
apply within areas of national jurisdiction, i.e., within the Russian EEZ.
These exceptions are significant because they mean the Draft Agreement
does not simply qualify the right of a DWFN to fish a straddling stock,108
but it also provides in some instances that the discretion of a coastal nation
to implement management measures is constrained. Importantly, the
agreement provides for some give and take on the part of nations on both
sides of the 200 mile limit-since neither side is being asked to bear the full
burden of conservation, it is more likely that the Draft Agreement will be
consented to by nations on both sides.
b. Application to nations
The Draft Agreement applies to nations that have consented to be
bound by it and for which the agreement is in force, 109 and to nations that
105 By late 1994, of 45 total documents of limited distribution published by the U.N. pertaining to
the conference, Russia was responsible for 13 of them.
106 Draft Agreement, art. 3(I), at 4.
107 Id.
108 See infra, part IV.B.
109 Draft Agreement, art. I(IXd), at 3. See also art. 37 (Ratification, acceptance, approval, and
formal confirmation), at 28, and art. 39 (Entry into force), at 28.
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become party to it in accordance with the CLOS. 110 By implication, it does
not apply to nations which do not consent to be bound by it, whether or not
such a nation is bound by the CLOS. Since some aspects of the Draft
Agreement differ from the CLOS, nations considering whether to accede to
the Draft Agreement must determine whether their interests are best served
under the Draft Agreement or the 1982 CLOS. In the context of the peanut
hole, it is difficult to imagine why Russia would not agree to be bound by
the agreement, for what is gained in constraining DWFNs far outweighs any
influence DWFNs can exert on Russian management under the Agreement.
When considering Russia's involvement as a DWFN in other fisheries,
however, the calculus is more complicated. Nonetheless, to the extent the
Draft Agreement imposes order on straddling stock fisheries, fishing
nations, both coastal and distant, have an interest in agreeing to its terms in
an effort to conserve stocks world-wide and to promote predictability on
which fishing industries and fishing nations can plan. Of course, that
interest in agreement will only result in broad accession if the Draft
Agreement is seen as fair and effective.
III. ANALYSIS
A. General Assessment of the Draft Agreement
The Draft Agreement is a significant, but cautious, step forward in
implementing the provisions of the CLOS regarding straddling stocks. It
purports to promote and to elaborate upon the CLOS III and must be read
consistently with that Convention, 112 but it does appear to alter slightly the
legal relationship between coastal and DWF nations. The Agreement does
provide clarity and specificity where the CLOS is vague, and to a limited
degree it prescribes competences of coastal and high seas fishing nations in
a straddling stock situation which may form the basis of negotiated
solutions to straddling stock conflicts. For disputes which cannot be
resolved by negotiation, the Draft Agreement incorporates the dispute
110 Draft Agreement, art. 1(2), at 3.
111 "[This] is a Conference ... to resolve the festering problems of high seas fishing in order to
give full and faithful effect to the very delicately balanced provisions of the Convention [CLOSI, so that
high seas fishery [sic] can continue to produce maximum sustainable yield, having regard to the
environmental, economic and other factors as provided for in the Convention, and without the kind of
conflicts that have resulted in the convening of this Conference." Statement made by the Chairman of the
Conference at the Opening of the Organizational Session, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 164/7 (1993).
112 Draft Agreement, art. 4, at 4.
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resolution provisions of the CLOS. Improving upon the original, the
revised Draft strengthens provisions for enforcement, but only in the
context of regional agreements. The Agreement may be widely adopted
because it protects DWFNs from extension of coastal state jurisdiction, and
it protects the management regime of coastal nations from being
undermined by high seas fishing. The specific ways in which the draft
agreement provides this protection are discussed below.
B. Compatibility
1. Generally
Almost all aspects of the Draft Agreement inhere in the provisions for
compatibility;"13 compatibility is in many ways the kernel of the
Agreement's vision for solving straddling stock disputes. Compatibility
requires that the conservation and management measures taken on the high
seas be compatible with those measures taken in areas under national juris-
diction to ensure conservation and management of the stock. States are
obligated by the Draft Agreement to cooperate for the purpose of achieving
compatible measures.114 Special emphasis is placed on the conservation
and management measures on the high seas, for which states shall:
take into account the conservation and management measures
established in accordance with article 61 of the Convention
[CLOS] in respect of the same stock(s) by coastal States in
areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures
established in respect of the high seas do not undermine the
effectiveness of those measures established in respect of the
same stocks(s) by coastal States in areas under national juris-
diction. . . .115
Article 56 of the CLOS grants coastal states sovereign rights over fisheries
in the EEZ, which means they can establish any management regime
consistent with the CLOS. Therefore, the Draft Agreement also affords
coastal states the authority to prescribe the limits of a management regime
113 Draft Agreement, art.7, at 7.
114 Draft Agreement, art. 7(2), at 7.
115 Draft Agreement, art. 7(2Xa), at 7 (emphasis added).
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on the high seas, inasmuch as high seas management cannot undermine
management in the EEZ. Thus, by inference, a coastal state has a superior
right to establish management of the fishing of straddling stock-a DWFN
cannot undermine the management of a coastal nation. This superior right
is especially significant because management is a broader concept than
conservation; management may be informed by the economic, social and
political interests of the coastal nation. Thus, a DWFN may be prevented
from fishing a straddling stock because of the economic policy, for instance,
of a coastal state.
Compatibility, however, works both ways. The Draft Agreement
provides many factors for nations to consider in seeking agreement on the
management of a straddling stock, such as the "geographical particularities
of the region, including the extent to which the stock(s) occur and are fished
in areas under national jurisdiction.""16 Presumably, these same factors
would be considered by an arbitral tribunal. Although a coastal nation has
priority in establishing the management regime, it does not have an
unqualifiedly superior right to a straddling stock. Qualifications of the right
will sometimes work in favor of DWFNs and sometimes in favor of the
coastal state. 117 The coastal state does, however, have the authority to set
the management regime for the stock and to expect that no DWFN will
undermine that regime except in unusual circumstances justifiable on
grounds listed in the Agreement. To the extent that compatibility requires a
coastal nation to take into account management practices on the high seas, it
imposes a new duty on coastal nations that is not found in the CLOS.
To achieve compatibility, the Draft Agreement imposes mechanisms
for international cooperation, such as the duty to pursue cooperation to
ensure effective conservation of straddling stocks. 18 These mechanisms
impose a duty either to establish a regional or subregional fisheries organi-
zation, or to negotiate directly (and in good faith) for the conservation and
management of straddling stocks. Included among these mechanisms is a
special provision for high seas enclaves surrounded by the EEZ of a single
state.
116 Draft Agreement, art. 7(2)(c), at 8.
117 Id. In addition to the qualifications of geography and the extent to which the stock is fished by
each nation, nations are to consider: the biological unity of the stock, previously agreed measures,
respective dependence of the nations on the stock, and the effects of management practices on the living
marine resource as a whole. Draft Agreement, art. 7(2)(b)-(e). Obviously, these factors provide much
room for balancing and an equitable allocation of the stock.
118 Draft Agreement, art. 8(l), at 9.
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2. In a High Seas Enclave
Article 14 of the Draft Agreement was written with the peanut hole in
mind. It provides in pertinent part:
States whose nationals fish for straddling stocks... in an area
of the high seas which is surrounded entirely by an area under
the national jurisdiction of a single State shall cooperate with
that State to establish conservation and management measures.
... Having regard for the geographical and ecological charac-
teristics of the area, States shall pay special attention... to the
establishment of compatible ... measures ... and shall ensure
that measures established in respect of the high seas take into
account the rights, duties and interests of the coastal State
under the [19821 Convention .... 119
Article 14 also provides that if the nations are unable to agree on conser-
vation and management measures "within a reasonable period of time," then
the provisions of article 7 concerning the use of dispute settlement to
establish provisional measures will apply.
The operative word in article 14 is special. The word emphasizes
compatibility and the rights, duties and interests of coastal states, but it adds
nothing new to the article 7 provisions on compatibility. Since the general
provisions on compatibility apply to high seas enclaves surrounded by the
EEZ of one state no less than anywhere else, it is unclear what article 14
adds to the Agreement. Possibly it is meant to ensure that enclaves
surrounded by one EEZ are to be treated as any other straddling stock situ-
ation, and unilateral extension of jurisdiction is unlawful. In this sense,
article 14 is a prophylactic measure protecting DWFNs. Alternatively, the
emphasis on special regard for geographical and ecological characteristics
of the enclave may be a concession to Russia, lending force to the Russian
argument that a coastal state is best situated to establish the management
regime for the high seas waters of an enclave surrounded by one state. How
the provisions for compatibility would affect regulation of fishing in the
peanut hole can best be understood in light of other aspects of the Draft
Agreement.
119 Draft Agreement, art. 14, at 14 (emphasis added).
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C. The Precautionary Approach
One innovation in the Draft Agreement is the requirement that coastal
nations and DWFNs apply the precautionary approach. The precautionary
approach is an attempt to prevent the absence of adequate scientific infor-
mation from resulting in the absence or delay of conservation measures. 120
It is not limited to any specific technique, but requires taking into account
the best available scientific information, and imposes a general duty to "be
more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate." 121
Minimum standards are to be agreed upon in advance, including stock-
specific reference points and the action to be taken if they are exceeded. 122
In the event reference points are exceeded, immediate action is to be taken
in accordance with pre-agreed courses of action to restore the stock. 123 The
precautionary approach is to consider the impacts of fishing on associated
ecosystems 124 and related species. 125 A one-page annex to the agreement
supplies suggested guidelines for applying the precautionary approach. 126
The approach emphasizes caution in the face of scientific uncertainty and
requires planning in advance so that if and when scientific evidence
indicates a stock is declining, appropriate responsive measures can quickly
be implemented.
Since the precautionary approach is only effective if the standards are
set at conservative levels, and are observed by fishing nations, the approach
does not guarantee conservation. It does, however, give a basis in intema-
tional law for managing conservatively in the' face of scientific uncertainty.
In other words, unless it can be proven unjustifiable to the satisfaction of a
dispute resolution tribunal, conservative management and fishing practices
are encouraged by the precautionary approach. However, the precautionary
approach is susceptible to abuse. For instance, a coastal state could attempt
to manage a straddling stock unduly conservatively where the stock borders
the high seas, while fishing intensively deep within the EEZ, thereby
pushing the burden of conservation off to a high-seas fishing state. Since
120 Draft Agreement, art 6(2), at 6.
121 Id.
122 Draft Agreement, art. 6(3)(b), at 6.
123 Id.
124 Draft Agreement, art. 6(3)(c), at 6.
125 Draft Agreement, art. 6(6), at 6.
126 Draft Agreement, Annex 2, at 37.
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the coastal state has sovereign rights over fisheries in the EEZ, the high seas
state could not dispute the practice, unless it could show that what was
ostensibly justified by the precautionary approach was really an abuse of the
rule.127
Coastal nations are required to apply the precautionary approach
within their EEZs, 128 and both coastal and DWFNs are required to apply the
precautionary approach outside the EEZ in giving effect to their duty to
cooperate according to CLOS.129 But there is no authority to administer or
enforce the precautionary approach, other than a signatory state requiring its
own nationals to act accordingly. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the
approach might have prevented the peanut hole conflict in a timely manner.
The nations that continued to fish the peanut hole after the Russian-imposed
moratorium justified doing so by asserting that there was no convincing
scientific evidence that pollack stocks in the Sea of Okhotsk were being
depleted. 130 A claim by Russia that DWFNs in the peanut hole were not
abiding by their obligation to apply the precautionary approach might be
submitted to a dispute resolution tribunal, and provisional measures applied.
A tribunal's decision would depend on the facts of the situation,
underscoring the need for good science and data collection.
D. Science and Data Collection
The collection and provision of scientific information is another of
the mechanisms for international cooperation in straddling stock manage-
ment. The Draft Agreement addresses the need for scientific data on fish
stocks and fishing practices by requiring nations party to the agreement to
collect and to exchange data in a detailed, timely, and accurate manner. 131
Nations are also to agree on the format for the data, 32 and to develop and to
share techniques and methodologies for the assessment of straddling
stocks. 133 An annex is provided which details a minimum standard for
collecting and sharing data.134
127 Draft Agreement, art. 32, at 26 (prohibits exercising rights of the Agreement in a manner which
constitutes an abuse of the right). The example given in the text may violate compatibility.
128 Draft Agreement, art. 3(1), at 4.
129 Draft Agreement, art. 5(c), at 5.
130 See supra, part I1.B.4.
131 DraftAgreement, art. 12(Ixa)-(c), at 12.
132 Draft Agreement, art. 12(2)(a), at 12.
133 Draft Agreement, art. 12(2)(b), at 12.
134 Draft Agreement, Annex 1, at 33.
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Collection of data in a unified format will elucidate the particulars of
any one straddling stock dispute and inform political negotiations among
states. Rarely, if ever, will scientific information alone be incontestable and
point to a clear solution, but it may forestall conflicts which have no scien-
tific basis. To the extent it serves this purpose, data collection is crucial to
solving straddling stock problems. When conflict does arise, though,
whether based on widely accepted scientific data or in the face of high
uncertainty, nations must turn to peaceful dispute settlement.135
E. Dispute Resolution Procedures
Making disputes subject to third-party resolution may forestall
conflicts before they begin by removing any incentive to disagree on man-
agement measures. If and when a dispute does arise, dispute resolution
provisions may be necessary for a peaceful resolution. To forestall and to
resolve disputes, the dispute resolution provisions of the Draft Agreement
adopt the provisions of the 1982 CLOS, 136 which allow parties to select a
means for dispute settlement from the following: the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea; the International Court of Justice; or an arbitral
tribunal. 137 The Draft Agreement allows disputes of a technical nature to be
referred to an ad hoc expert panel. 138 If nations are unable to agree on
provisional measures pending the formal resolution of a dispute, then this
disagreement may be submitted to dispute resolution as well. 139 The court
or tribunal hearing a dispute also has authority under the Agreement to
prescribe provisional measures when states party to a dispute are unable to
agree on provisional measures within a reasonable period of time. 140
Dispute resolution procedures would probably have been highly
effective in the peanut hole conflict. Given the valuable pollack resource
and the small (in area) high seas fishery, all nations involved have an
interest not only in maintaining the resource over time, but also in having
some (if limited) right to catch fish. A neutral tribunal is well situated to
decide aspects of a management regime that the parties themselves cannot
135 Draft Agreement, art. 26, at 24 ("States have the obligation to settle their disputes by . . .
peaceful means...").
136 Draft Agreement, art. 29(2), at 25.
137 CLOS, supra note 4, art. 287. An arbitral tribunal is the default means. Id.
138 Draft Agreement, art. 28, at 24.
139 Draft Agreement, art. 30(1), at 25.
140 Draft Agreement, art. 30(3), at 26.
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agree upon; but nations would prefer to retain control over as much as
possible so as to compromise in the manner that best serves their interests.
Only disputes that cannot be compromised are likely to be submitted to the
tribunal. With a dispute settlement mechanism in the background,
disagreement, instead of perpetuating the status quo, leads to compromise,
because nations are likely to be wary of the unpredictability of an arbitral
decision. As is typical of international law, however, enforcement of a
favorable decision remains problematic.
F. Enforcement
The Draft Agreement contemplates four types of enforcement of its
provisions: enforcement by flag state; 14 1 by port state; 142 according to
international cooperation; 143 and according to regional agreement. 144
According to the Draft Agreement, the flag state bears the responsibility for
ensuring that vessels flying its flag comply with agreed measures for the
conservation and management of straddling stocks and that they do not
undermine the effectiveness of those measures. 145 Therefore, enforcement
depends upon the motivation and capability of the flag state. Improvement
of flag state enforcement is bolstered by the Food and Agriculture
Organization's ("FAO") Compliance Agreement. 146 The FAO agreement
requires states to ensure that vessels authorized to fly the state's flag do not
undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and management
measures. 147 If widely adopted, the FAO agreement will significantly
improve the international system of flag state enforcement of provisions of
international law.148
141 Draft Agreement, art. 19, at 17.
142 Draft Agreement, art. 22, at 21.
143 Draft Agreement, art. 20, at 18.
144 Draft Agreement, art. 21, at 19.
145 The Draft Agreement also imposes a licensing requirement on flag states, art. 18 (3Xa) at 15,
and requires states to authorize vessels flying its flag to be used for fishing on the high seas "only where it
is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in respect of such vessels under the conservation and under
the provisions of this Agreement." Draft Agreement, art. 18(1), at 15.
146 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Nov. 20, 1993, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations; 33 I.L.M 968 [hereinafter FAO Agreement].
147 FAO Agreement, art. Ill § 1; 33 I.L.M, 968, 971.
148 As of July 27, 1994, no nation has deposited an instrument of acceptance of the agreement. Id
at 968.
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An important consequence of the flag state enforcement regime of the
Draft Agreement is that a coastal nation is not authorized to extend juris-
diction over fishing operations beyond its EEZ even in straddling stock
situations. Instead, the agreement provides for a dispute resolution
procedure, which requires adherence by all nations to the Agreement, and
requires effective enforcement by the flag state of its nationals. This system
will work only when the flag state has a strong interest in maintaining
international adherence to the Agreement, such as to prevent coastal state
attempts at extension of jurisdiction and abandonment of the 200 mile limit
to the EEZ. It also depends on technological feasibility, such as the ability
of a nation to police vessels flying its flag in all comers of the globe. Lack
of provision for enforcement authority in the CLOS led, in part, to failure in
the management of straddling stocks, reiterating the tragedy of the
commons. However, without the delegation of enforcement from fishing
nations to a regional or other authority, enforcement must remain the
responsibility of sovereign flag states. Given the political pressures brought
to bear on a nation from its nationals, though, it is doubtful that a system
resting on flag state enforcement can reach the level of enforcement desired
by coastal nations seeking to protect straddling stocks. It may eventually
take regional fisheries organizations empowered with enforcement
capabilities to manage straddling stocks effectively.
The second type of enforcement provision is enforcement in the
context of a regional agreement. The Draft Agreement has strong provi-
sions regarding regional agreements, including arrangements for enforce-
ment by authorized inspecting states until the flag state can take control of
the vessel alleged to be in violation. 149 These provisions are similar to
provisions in the Donut Hole Convention in that they allow for a continued
boarding by a coastal state (in the case of the Draft Agreement) or any other
party to the Convention (in the case of the Donut Hole Convention) when
the flag state does not take prompt action. In neither case is any state other
than the flag state authorized to prosecute or to impose a penalty on a vessel
(or its crew) alleged to be in violation, but the threat of continual boarding
puts pressure on a flag state to take control of a violation situation, and
prevents continuation of a violation. Notably, the Draft Agreement does not
limit the enforcement provisions to vessels that are party to the regional
agreement. Once a regional agreement is in effect, it preempts other
management regimes for the area. Thus, although joining a regional
149 Draft Agreement, art 21(7), at 20.
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agreement is voluntary, there is an incentive to join since non-members and
members alike are subject to the regional enforcement regime.
While it is unlikely that Russia would relinquish its claim to control
of the Sea of Okhotsk, and hence unlikely that Russia would agree to any
enforcement other than Russian enforcement in the peanut hole, some form
of regional arrangement is foreseeable.150 An arrangement is possible
because is likely that DWFNs would agree to authorize some degree of
Russian enforcement in the peanut hole as part of a management regime
which guarantees DWFN access to pollack within the Russian EEZ. This is
effectively what is being done presently as nations agree not to fish in the
peanut hole in return for access to pollack in the Russian EEZ. The test case
will be Poland. If Poland holds out for lower prices for access to Russian
pollack, it may in effect be requiring Russia to subsidize compatibility in
the peanut hole-a situation ripe for further conflict. Because it is
consistent with the Draft Agreement and addresses a problem similar in
numerous ways to the peanut hole conflict, the Donut Hole Convention may
serve as a model for an improved enforcement regime. The regime would
allow continued Russian boarding of foreign vessels when flag states fail to
take control of or to investigate their ships alleged to be in violation of
conservation or management measures in the peanut hole. This regime
would be a great stride toward conserving the pollack stock in the peanut
hole.
The two other enforcement provisions of the Draft Agreement do
little to bolster the enforcement scheme. International cooperation is
encouraged, allowing a flag state to request the assistance of another nation
in investigation, and to grant permission to a coastal state to board a vessel
of the flag state. 151 But cooperation still remains within the discretion of
the flag state. Cooperation can help surmount some of the logistical diffi-
culties of enforcement (such as when a flag state does not have a ship
nearby to investigate), but it cannot overcome flag state reluctance to
constrain the fishing of its nationals.
A port state is authorized, inter alia, to inspect documents, fishing
gear, and catch on board when vessels are voluntarily in its ports. 152 Also, a
port state may establish regulations for the purpose of prohibiting access to
its ports when it has been established that the catch has been taken in a
150 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
151 Draft Agreement, art. 20, at 18.
152 Draft Agreement, art. 22(2), at 21.
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manner that undermines the conservation and management measures per-
taining to a straddling stock. 153 This ability to deny port access creates an
incentive for a DWFN wishing to use a foreign port to comply with fishery
management measures of a straddling stock near a port state. But alone,' this
is not an effective enforcement mechanism.
It is uncertain whether the enforcement provisions of the Draft
Agreement are sufficiently strong to achieve broad compliance. Flag state
enforcement, the predominant enforcement regime, is necessarily less
rigorous than a regime depending on third-party enforcement. Ironically,
though, the weakness of the Draft Agreement enforcement provisions may
be one of its strengths. By not subjecting DWFNs to enforcement by the
coastal nation in the absence of a regional organization or arrangements, the
Draft Agreement offers protection to DWFNs which may induce them to
subscribe to the Agreement. Russia apparently never did attempt to vigor-
ously enforce the moratorium it imposed on the peanut hole, but it has been
suggested that if coastal states do not take steps to enforce their legal rights
to manage the fishing of straddling stocks, they may compromise their
rights.154 To maintain immunity from foreign enforcement, DWFNs may
accept some qualification of their right to fish a straddling stock.
IV. SCENARIOS
Since the Draft Agreement indicates how straddling stock conflicts
are likely to be resolved in the future, it is constructive to speculate how the
peanut hole conflict would have transpired if the Agreement were in effect
when the conflict first arose. Additionally, since the conflict is not yet
resolved, such speculation may actually forecast the future of fishing in the
area. The following four scenarios illustrate how the Draft Agreement
might resolve the peanut hole conflict.
A. First Scenario
The facts in this scenario are as follows: scientific data of the pollack
population and catch data of the relevant fishing states have been recorded
so that an accurate determination of the effect of high seas fishing practices
on the management and conservation measures of Russia can be
153 Draft Agreement, art. 22(3), at 21.
154 BURKE, supra note 4, at 136.
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determined. The. DWFNs are vindicated because the data reveal
conclusively (to a dispute resolution tribunal or court) that high seas fishing
does not undermine coastal management and conservation. On the facts of
this scenario, Russia may be unsatisfied because poaching from the EEZ by
ships fishing the peanut hole continues, but poaching is a distinct and
separate complaint which should not be addressed as a straddling stock
conflict. Russia may also desire to sell access to its EEZ, thereby gaining
foreign currency in exchange for excess pollack, but a DWFN will not pay
for access when it is legally justified in catching the same fish freely on the
high seas.
When conservation and management practices do not conflict, there
is no straddling stock problem. If nations abide by the provisions of the
agreement that increase the amount and quality of scientific information on
straddling stocks, then some purported problems may be revealed not to be
problems at all. Thus, one value of the Draft Agreement is in separating
spurious from real conflicts.
B. Second Scenario
In this scenario, the facts are the same as in the first scenario, except
that although conservation is not undermined (i.e., there is no threat to the
continued existence of a healthy stock), Russian management of the stock is
undermined by a DWFN. Recall that Russian management may be
informed by considerations other than conservation, such as economic and
social policy. If DWFN fishing is curtailed in this situation, it may be
subject to coastal state national policy determinations that are broader than a
scientific concern for the maintenance of the fishery. In this case, a tribunal
is likely to consider carefully the qualifications on the superiority of the
coastal state right to management, and take into account such factors as the
respective dependence of the coastal state and the DWFN on the stock. 155
The decision of a court or tribunal in this case would involve balancing of
interests by the tribunal, and any outcome is likely to be fact dependent and
difficult to predict. On these facts, it is probable that the DWFNs would be
allowed to fish in the peanut hole on a restricted basis.
155 Draft Agreement, art. 7(2)(d), at 8.
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C. Third Scenario
The facts in this scenario are that data has been collected and proves
conclusively that DWFN fishing does undermine coastal conservation and
management measures. In this case, articles 7 and 14 of the Draft
Agreement places the burden on the DWFNs to modify their fishing so that
they do not undermine coastal state management. This scenario is probably
how the peanut hole fishery would have transpired if the Draft Agreement
was in force in 1992. It may transpire this way if the conflict continues or
rekindles in the future, and the Draft Agreement is in force.
This scenario plays out similarly to how earlier interpretations of
CLOS would have it, but does so more clearly and with greater textual
authority. According to the Draft Agreement, the compatibility requirement
will influence the determination of a dispute settlement tribunal in favor of a
coastal state if a dispute is brought to it, and that in turn will influence nego-
tiations among Russia and DWFNs. These influences are brought to bear
on parties to the conflict by the Draft Agreement's implication that high
seas fishing rights are generally submissive to the right of the coastal state
to manage fish stocks within its EEZ even though that entails significant
power of the coastal state to influence management practices beyond the
EEZ. The flag states of vessels fishing the high seas portion of the strad-
dling stock will be responsible for enforcing curtailment of fishing to the
level that coastal state management is no longer undermined. This ensures
compatibility of fishing practices within and beyond the EEZ, but it affords
the coastal state an upper hand in the management decisions. Only in this
way can the fundamental inconsistency of the EEZ regime (it stops at 200
miles when the fish do not) be resolved.
D. Fourth Scenario
In this scenario the data collected do not reveal anything conclu-
sively, but point only to possibilities that are rebuttable or provable only
with further information-maybe even information that is difficult or
impossible to obtain in any useful time frame. The fourth scenario is likely
to be the most common in straddling stock situations, and it is here that the
Draft Agreement demonstrates the most foresight. According to the Draft
Agreement, the precautionary approach must be applied to ensure that the
fishery does survive. The absence of certainty is not a justification for
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abandon of caution. In the peanut hole, catch levels would probably be
reduced to levels similar to those within the EEZ, and scientific studies
would be launched to ascertain what higher level of fishing the peanut hole
could sustain without undermining the Russian fishery within the EEZ. The
power of the Draft Agreement lies in this fourth scenario. The Agreement
provides a rational hierarchy of interests in straddling stocks, and therefore
an effective and plausible solution to the problem. The primary obstacle to
its adoption is getting DWFNs to accede to it.
V. CONCLUSION
The Draft Agreement provides rights and procedures that can help
prevent and resolve straddling stock conflicts like the peanut hole. The
compatibility requirement is the primary mechanism of the Draft
Agreement; it ensures that conservation and management measures of a
straddling stock on each side of the 200 mile EEZ limit will not undermine
such measures on the other side. Although the Draft Agreement imposes
the obligation to ensure compatibility on both coastal and distant water
fishing nations, it appears to give priority to coastal state management, thus
subjecting the freedom to fish on the high seas to the rights, interests, and
duties of a coastal state. Many factors are to be considered, however, in
reaching agreement on (or dispute resolution of) compatible measures, and a
coastal nation will not always be able unilaterally to establish the conser-
vation and management regime of a straddling stock. Enforcement under
the Draft Agreement remains a problem; however, stronger enforcement
provisions would probably decrease the willingness of nations to accede to
the agreement. For the Draft Agreement to be effective, nations must have
the political will to enforce the Agreement's provisions on ships flying the
national flag.
Because the Draft Agreement clearly qualifies the right to fish the
high seas, DWFNs may be disinclined to consent to it. If, however, they
feel that their consent will prevent the threatened extensions of jurisdiction
that would even more severely curtail the fisheries available to them, then
they may see the Draft Agreement as a compromise in their best interest.
Furthermore, since the Draft Agreement affords DWFNs a right, however
weak, to require that management of fishing in the EEZ be compatible with
high seas management, the Draft Agreement gives DWFNs something the
CLOS did not. DWFNs should consent to the Draft Agreement, as should
MAY 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
coastal nations including Russia, because what is lost in particular instances
is eclipsed by what is gained in the aggregate, namely, a procedure for
solving straddling stock disputes by consent. In turn, a solution to strad-
dling stock problems can lead to an increase in the productivity of the
worlds' fisheries which, ominously, has been declining since 1989.156
It appears that in the near future Russia will clear foreign vessels
from the peanut hole by means of bilateral negotiations, allowing foreign
vessels to buy quotas allowing them to fish in the Russian EEZ. This is the
method preferred by CLOS and the Draft Agreement because it is voluntary
and presumably beneficial to both nations party to the negotiated agree-
ment. Russia, however, is working to rebuild its fishing fleet. 157  If
successful, there may come a time in the future when Russia does not want
to grant quotas to its EEZ because Russian fishermen are capable of
harvesting all of the allowable catch, or Russia's asking price may become
too high, and foreign nations may again look to the peanut hole as an alter-
native fishing ground. In such cases, an international law like the Draft
Agreement should be in place to prevent or to quickly resolve any conflict.
Russia may yet decide to extend jurisdiction so that there is no high
seas enclave, and thus no fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk that is not subject to
Russian management. DWFNs would then be forced to negotiate with
Russia for the terms of their fishing anywhere in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Russia, in that case, would retain the power to exclude any nation that does
not negotiate a sweet enough deal. It is the threat of this occurrence, now or
in the future, that might inspire all fishing nations to accede to the Draft
Agreement. With the Draft Agreement in force, straddling stocks like the
Sea of Okhotsk Alaskan pollack are more likely to be harvested sustainably
for years to come.
156 "Marine fisheries catches peaked at 86 million metric tons in 1989, and subsequently decreased
in 1990, 1991, and 1992." Fisheries Aspects, supra note 9, at 2.
157 Focus: Fishing in the Russian Far East, RUSSIAN FAR E. UPDATE, Oct. 1994, at 7.
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